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Abstract   
This study investigates the relationship between two tasks of perspective taking, the social 
perspective taking ability, namely theory of mind, and the spatial one, namely mental rotation, in 
preschool aged children. Both abilities develop during preschool age (Frick et al., 2013; Wellmann et 
al., 2001). We investigated 83 children aged between three and four years regarding their theory of 
mind and mental rotation ability. A significant correlation between both tasks was found for those 
children, who were able to solve the mental rotation task. This relation was no longer significant 
when analyzing the two age groups separately. Due to the small sample size as well as the 
performance in the mental rotation test more research is needed to investigate this relationship and 
its role in development.  
 
About the Author 
Dr. Jennifer Lehmann studied sport science at the University of Cologne and obtained her PhD from 
the University of Regensburg. There she is working as a lecturer and researcher at the Institute of 
Sport science on projects dealing with the relationship of cognitive and motor abilities  
Prof. Dr. Petra Jansen studied biological and social anthropology, psychology and mathematics at the 
Johannes-Gutenberg University of Mainz. She obtained her PhD and her habilitation in experimental 
psychology at the Universities of Duisburg-Essen and Düsseldorf. Since 2008, she is the head of the 
department of sport science in Regensburg. Her research focuses on the relation of motor, cognitive, 
and emotional processes, gender difference in cognitive abilities, embodiment and mindfulness. 
The research of both authors focuses on the investigation of the development of spatial cognition, 
especially mental rotation. They could show that this development relates to motor development as 
well as working memory development. 
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Relationship between theory of mind and mental rotation 
 
Public Interest Statement 
The ability to take the perspective of others is one of the important aspects of social development. It 
is investigated with the so-called theory of mind paradigm. In the presented study, we could show 
that this ability relates to the spatial ability to imagine pictures from another point of view. This gives 
a hint that the development of social and spatial abilities of perspective taking is somehow 
interwoven in young children. However, more research needs to be done to show the exact 
interaction between those abilities and in the broader sense the interaction between social and 
cognitive development. 
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Introduction 
 It is the main goal of this paper to investigate if the social ability to impute mental states 
(theory of mind) relates to the spatial ability to imagine objects in mind (mental rotation) in 
preschool children. Thereby, the Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to states, such as feelings, wishes as 
well as beliefs, of oneself or others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). In former studies the ability to 
attribute mental states has often been investigated with the false-belief-tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). In these tasks the calculation of a wrong false belief is claimed even though one self’s 
knowledge is different (false belief) or in which the belief of another person is in accordance to one’s 
own belief (true belief). One example of a specific task could be the following, where the 
experimenter presented to the child the story with two toy figures, Maxi and the mother of Maxi. In 
this story, Maxi places a chocolate in a drawer and leaves the room, when the mother comes into the 
room and finds the chocolate in the drawer she takes it out and puts it in the fridge. Children who 
have developed a ToM can answer the question where Maxi would look for the chocolate when he 
comes into the room again. The crucial development for an explicit understanding of mental 
processes in children takes place at the age between 3 and 5 years. Wellman, Cross, and Watson 
(2001) showed in their meta-analysis that the development of the ToM-ability is independent of the 
kind of the used ToM-tasks as well as of cultural influences. While children at the age of 30 month 
could only solve 20% of the false belief tasks, children at the age of 44 month were able to solve 50% 
of those tasks correctly. At the age of four years most of the children can solve ToM-tasks properly, 
which means that they have an understanding of false beliefs.  
Mental rotation describes the spatial ability to mentally rotate two- or three-dimensional objects as 
fast and as accurate as possible (Linn & Petersen, 1985; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). This ability is 
often used in daily live (e.g. mathematics (Hegarty & Kozheynikov, 1999)) and develops continuously 
from 3 to 5 years with huge individual differences (Estes, 1998; Frick, Ferrara, & Newcombe, 2013a; 
Frick, Hansen, & Newcombe, 2013; Levine, Huttenlocher, Taylor, & Langrock, 1999; Möhring, & Frick, 
2013; Newcombe, & Frick, 2010). Frick et al. (2013) indicate that children who answer above chance 
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level have an understanding of mental rotation strategy. Thereby one kind of strategy is often a 
perspective taking strategy. To solve the mental rotation task one puts oneself into the task to 
change perspective and to detect which solution is the right one. Estes (1998) stated that the 
awareness and the conceptual understanding of mental phenomena develop together and seem to 
influence each other. This means that children develop an awareness of their mind´s activity and can 
differentiate thinking from other internal processes such as seeing or talking.  For both tasks, mental 
rotation and theory of mind, a deliberated access to mental stimulation is necessary. He concludes 
that those children, who are not able to perform a mental rotation task properly, do not have a 
sufficient conceptual understanding of mental phenomenon such as theory of mind (Estes, 1998). 
Thus, children who have not developed awareness for internal processes do not understand mental 
rotation and theory of mind. Frick, Möhring, and Newcombe (2014) analysed in a review theoretically 
the development of mental rotation and theory of mind in kindergartners and argued for a possible 
common underlying cognitive and developmental mechanism due to the results that some children 
at the age of four years can already solve both tasks whereas others fail in both tasks. This underlying 
process could be the mental simulation that can be used as a strategy to solve problems. Frick et al. 
(2014) assumed that an improvement in imaginative power could help children to simulate more 
complex situations and might be responsible for the developmental progress in the ability of the 
theory of mind. Additionally, they argue: “…the ability to flexibly change mental representations may 
even be more fundamental…” (Frick et al., 2014, p.11).  
Even though MR and ToM abilities require perspective-taking abilities, namely spatial and 
social ones, the relation of both abilities has not been systematically investigated until now. Perner 
and Roessler (2012) argue that perspective taking, which was first investigated by Piaget and Inhelder 
(1956) in the seminal three mountains task, is required to develop the social perspective taking 
ability assessed in ToM tasks. Viana, Zambrana, Karevold and Pons (2016) demonstrated that the 
ToM abilities of children between 5 and 9 years of age are better predictors of their spatial abilities in 
a social context than their age, their gender or their spatial abilities assessed in an individual setting. 
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However, in a study with 12 to 50 months infants, Sodian and Kristen-Antonow (2015) provided 
evidence that “level 1” perspective-taking abilities were not correlated with later false belief 
understanding.  Level 1 perspective taking abilities demonstrate that children know what others can 
or cannot see from their own viewpoint. 
Thus,  the existing scientific evidence is conflicting: Whereas Perner and Roessler (2012) 
assumed a positive correlation between perspective taking and ToM, Sodian and Kristen-Antonow 
(2015) did not. However, both studies did not relate mental rotation performance to ToM. For this, 
this study will characterize the interplay between ToM and mental rotation abilities. According to 
Frick et al. (2014), we assume a positive correlation between mental rotation and theory of mind. 
Method 
Participants 
 In total, 83 children from two German kindergartens participated in this study with a mean 
age of M = 3.54 (SD = .52). The sample consisted of 43 girls and 40 boys, which were further divided 
into the two age groups of 3-year-old children (M = 3.05, SD = .22, 17 girls and 25 boys) and 4-year-
old children (M = 4.04, SD = .03, 26 girls and 15 boys). This age range was chosen based on the 
literature showing an important developmental shift in the explicit understanding of mental 
processes (e.g. Wellman et al., 2001; Henning, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009) between three and five 
years of age. As most of the four-year old children can already differentiate between visual illusion 
and reality, whereas most of the 3-year-old children are not able to do so, we chose this age range 
(Perner & Lang, 1999). The groups were separated into those who were 3-year-old and those who 
were 4-year-old. Thereby, the cut-off-criterion was the age itself. The age range for the 3-year-old 
children was from 36 month until 47 month and the age range for the 4-year-old children was from 
48 month until 59 month. All parents gave their written consent for participation of their child. The 
experiment was conducted according to the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological 
Association. 
Material 
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Questionnaire 
  The questionnaire included demographic data as well as questions regarding the 
socioeconomic status.  
Theory of Mind test 
 The Theory of Mind (ToM) was measured with the German translation of the Theory of Mind 
scale for 3- to 5-year old children form Wellman, Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii and Lalonde (2004) (in the 
German version: Hofer & Aschersleben, 2007). The test consists of five different independent tasks 
and one additional task with increasing difficulty. While the first and second task addresses the 
distinction on oneself wish (belief) form others, the third task is about access to knowledge, the 
fourth and fifth tasks are about false believes regarding places and contents. The additional task 
captures whether children can differentiate between pretended and real feelings. All tasks are 
presented in short stories and with “playmobil figures”, accordingly to the age of the children. Each 
task is tested with two questions regarding the aim as well as control and memory. Only if both 
questions are answered correctly the task will be interpreted as solved. This results in a maximum 
score of 5. Additionally, a false belief score can be calculated out of the tasks 4 and 5, with a 
maximum score of 2. Due to inconsistence in literature (Aschersleben, Hofer, & Jovanovic, 2008; 
Henning, Spinath, & Aschersleben, 2010; Wellmann, et al., 2004), both scores are used here. The unit 
of measurement of the ToM as well as the false belief tasks were integral numbers with the 
maximums reported above. Due to the use of this scale in earlier studies (Lui et al., 2008; Wellman et 
al., 2001) we used this scale.  
Mental rotation test 
 The ability of mental rotation was assessed with the Picture Mental Rotation Test (BIRT) 
(Quaiser-Pohl, Rohe, & Amberger, 2010), which is approved for the age range of our study. This no-
time limit paper and pencil test consists of two examples as well as 16 test items. Each item is 
composed of one standardized picture on the left side of the paper and three repeated pictures on 
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the right side of the paper, rotated 45°, 90°, 135°, or 180° in relation to the standardized object on 
the left side. Only one of the three comparison pictures is identical to the standard item, while the 
other two pictures are mirror-reversed. Children have to mark which one of the three rotated 
pictures is identical to the standard item. Split-half reliability is .74 and the maximum score is 16, 
with the unit of measurement of integral numbers. Figure 1 shows an example for the Theory of 
Mind and the Mental Rotation Task. The task has been already used with kindergarten children in 
former studies (Jansen, & Heil, 2010; Lehmann, Quaiser-Pohl, & Jansen, 2014). 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Procedure 
 Each child was tested separately in a quiet room in two kindergartens. The order of the tasks 
was counterbalanced across the children. At the beginning of the tests it was explained to the child 
that some new games were going to be played to avoid a situation in which the children felt under 
pressure. At the end of the test session, the children received small presents for their participation. 
One female examiner collected data. 
Statistical analysis 
 For all measurements, we used the number of correct solved items as indicator. For the 
analysis of the mental rotation task we only included those children, who did not guess and 
answered at least 50% of the task correctly. Based on this criterion, we had to exclude 37 children 
from the analysis resulting in a sample of N = 46 (M = 3.66, SD = .49, 27 girls and 19 boys; 3 years: M 
= 3.05, SD = .02, 6 girls and 12 boys; 4 years: M = 4.04, SD = .03, 21 girls and 7 boys). We then 
conducted a multivariate analysis for the performance in the BIRT, ToM and False-Believe Task with 
age as independent variable. Due to the fact that the multivariate box-test was not significant, the 
hypothesis of the equality of the variance-covariance matrices is not rejected (p = .054) and 
therefore the requirements to perform a multivariate analysis are fulfilled. Additionally, a correlation 
analysis between mental rotation and ToM performance was conducted. We alpha-corrected the 
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correlational analysis in line with Bonferroni (according to Field (2009)), resulting in a corrected 
significance level of p < .017. 
Results 
 The analysis of variance revealed more correct solved items for the 4-year old children in the 
in the ToM-scale (F(1,44) = 37.21, p<.01, ƞ=.458) as well as the false belief task (F(1,44) = 18.99, 
p<.01, ƞ=.301), but no significant differences in the BIRT (F(1,44) = 1.49, n.s.).  
Insert Table 1 here 
When calculating correlational analyses between the BIRT, ToM and the False-Belief Task we found 
significant correlations between the BIRT score and the ToM score (r(46)=.356, p < .017) as well as 
the BIRT and the False-Belief task (r(43)=.395, p < .017). Additionally, we calculated a correlational 
analysis for the two age groups. We neither found correlations for the 3-year old children (BIRT and 
ToM: r(18)=.282, p=.257, and BIRT and False-Belief task: r(18)=.444, p=.065) nor for the 4-year old 
children (BIRT and ToM: r(28)=.338, p=.079, and BIRT and False-Belief: r(28)=.345, p=.072 
Discussion  
To our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the relationship between mental rotation and 
ToM in children between three and four years of age. While it seems that mental rotation and ToM 
have common underlying processes (Estes, 1998; Frick et al., 2014), these processes could be the 
ability to perform mental simulations and transformations (Estes, 1998; Frick et al., 2014). The 
presented study expected to deliver first hints not only in a theoretical but also in a practical way on 
this relationship between the two abilities.  
We found a significant correlation between mental rotation performance and theory of mind for the 
sample of those children who were able to solve the BIRT (N = 46). For this, our results can confirm 
the assumption of Perner and Roessler’s regarding a relation of spatial and social perspective taking 
in young children. Moreover, the results of the study are in line with the theoretical review of Frick et 
al. (2014) and we assume that the ability to mentally imagine something might be the underlying 
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relevant mechanism. Nevertheless, more research is needed to investigate, if the ability to mentally 
simulate or the flexibility to change mental representations or for example the development of 
executive functions is the relevant underlying mechanism for the relation between MR and ToM. 
However, there was no correlation when analyzing the two age groups, which might be due to the 
small number of children in each age group. It seems that in this context age is more relevant for the 
cognitive performance in mental rotation than the ability to impute mental states. Additionally, we 
only found age effects for the theory of mind ability but no such effects for the mental rotation 
ability. While it seems that at the age of three- and four-years no differences in mental rotation are 
present, as least in our sample, there are age effects for the theory of mind. This is in line with 
former studies showing that most children at the age of four are able to solve a ToM task but 
children at the age of three often fail (Wellman et al., 2001). The fact that we did not find any age 
effects in mental rotation might be due to the test applied. Although this test has been constructed 
for the relevant age group it might not be sensitive enough to differentiate the age groups tested. To 
conclude, a relation between spatial and social perspective taking was found. This is important due 
to the fact that the results show that at least some aspects of social and cognitive development 
should not be treated separately. This result provides evidence that a social training in kindergarten 
might enhance cognitive abilities as well as a cognitive training might improve social development. 
Confirmation of a common mechanism between false belief task and visual perspective taking comes 
from a meta-analysis of fMRI studies showing a common activation of false belief reasoning and 
visual perspective taking in the left dorsal temporal parietal junction (Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & 
Perner, 2013). 
Limitations and further research  
The study is limited by the fact, that only 46 out of 83 children were able to solve the mental rotation 
task above chance level successfully. The BIRT was chosen because it has been successfully applied in 
the study of Lehmann et al. (2014) with children as young as three and four years of age. However, 
this has to be considered carefully in further studies and it has to be reconsidered if other mental 
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rotation test should be applied. Due to the fact that the coefficients for the separate sample had high 
values, and at least one had a larger value than the complete sample, this might indicate, that the 
analysis lacked statistical power. Additionally, it might be that the tests we used lead to floor effects. 
Therefore, the study should be replicated with an increased sample size to have a more detailed look 
into the relationship between the two abilities for the different age groups.  
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Table 1: Demographic and performance data of the children  
 Total sample 
(n = 46) 
3-year old 
( n= 18) 
4-year old 
(n = 28) 
p 
 
Mean age (SD) 3.66 (.49) 3.05 (.02) 4.04 (.03)  
Sex 
27 girls 
19 boys 
6 girls 
12 boys 
21 girls 
7 boys 
.238 
BIRT (SD) 9.24 (1.32) 8.94 (.99) 9.43 (1.48) .229 
ToM (SD) 2.57 (1.41) 1.39 (.92) 3.32 (1.12) .000 
False Believe (SD) .80 (.86) .22 (.43) 1.18 (.86) .000 
 
 
 
